In a recent issue of this Journal, Carr and Mathewson (1988) test a model of the impact of limited and unlimited liability regimes on the nature of firms by comparing the performance of law firms operated as partnerships and sole proprietorships (and therefore subject to unlimited liability) with that of law firms operated as corporations (and therefore subject to limited liability).' In their model, "unlimited liability by raising the cost of ownership rights discourages investment in the firm, causing legal firms to be inefficiently small" (p. 779). The peculiar history of organizational form in the legal profession seemed to provide an opportunity to test their model's prediction. Prior to the 1960s, state law prevented law firms from incorporating, with the effect that unlimited liability was mandated. During the 1960s and early 1970s, a large number of states passed statutes that allowed law and other professional service firms to incorporate, thereby giving such firms the option to elect either an unlimited or a limited liability regime. The result was a universe that included some law firms that were subject to unlimited liability and some that were subject to lim- ' The authors also test their model using data on Scottish banking between 1795 and 1882. My comments (and expertise) are limited to their discussion of law firms. [Journal of Political Economy, 1991, vol 99, no 7701-3 [1960] ). It was in response to these regulations that states adopted statutes authorizing incorporation by professional firms, thereby assuring them the availability of favorable tax treatment (Cavitch 1988, p. 81-8) . Limited liability simply was not a factor.3
2 While the treatment of pension plans is the most significant tax benefit from incorporation, other benefits also exist. These include the ability to provide group life insurance of up to $50,000 per employee and medical expense reimbursement payments, in both cases with the premiums and payments deductible by the corporation and nontaxable to the employee (Cavitch 1988, pp. 81-3-81-4) . 3 Indeed, different states provide quite different amounts of limited liability to professional corporations. In particular, some statutes, such as those of Wisconsin and Maine, provide that a professional shareholder is liable for the acts of other shareholders to the same extent as if the shareholder were a partner (Eaton and Church 1987, pp. 9-44.2-9-46 Suppose that a large firm earns $100,000 per partner and that each partner's marginal tax rate is 70 percent. For the large firm, the value of the increased pension deduction resulting from incorporation is $5,250 per partner.5 Now suppose that a small firm earns only $50,000 per partner and that each partner's marginal rate is only 35 percent.6 For the small firm, the value of the increased pension deduction resulting from incorporation is only $1,312 per partner.7
The difference in the tax value of incorporation between large and small firms results from the proportional increase in tax savings due to the large firm's greater profit per partner and the more than proportional increase in tax savings due to the large-firm partners'
higher marginal tax rate.
I The Tax Reform Act of 1969 reduced the top marginal rate for earned income to 60 percent for 1970 and to 50 percent for 1971 and thereafter. 5 On these assumptions, the pension contribution per partner allowed an incorporated firm is roughly $20,000 and that allowed an unincorporated firm is roughly $12,500. The value of incorporating is 70 percent of the difference.
6 These tax rates were chosen to illustrate the point. I have not tried to select rates that were in place at one time or another during the relevant period. In all events, as long as the rate structure is progressive, the outcome is the same. 7For incorporated small firms, the tax value of the pension contribution is $3,500, assuming $50,000 of earnings that is paid out 80 percent ($40,000) as salary and 20 percent ($10,000) as pension contribution, with a 35 percent marginal income tax rate for partners. For unincorporated small firms, the tax value of the pension contribution is $2,283, assuming the same earnings but paid out, as in n. 5, 87.5 percent ($43,750) as salary (reflecting the lower maximum contribution allowed unincorporated entities) and 12.5 percent ($6,250) as pension contribution, with a 35 percent marginal income tax rate for partners. The tax value of incorporation is $1,312 ($3,500 -$2,188). (Maister 1982, pp. 15, 18; Gilson and Mnookin 1989, pp. 584-85) . Of the 100 most successful corporate firms for 1987, differences in leverage explain 34.3 percent of the differences among the firms in profitability per partner (Gilson and Mnookin 1989, p. 585) . Thus larger firms that are capable of supporting a number of employee lawyers for each partner will generate more profit per partner than smaller firms whose partners are not similarly leveraged.8
The more plausible relationship between firm size and liability re- To be sure, the tax advantages of incorporation do not explain why a substantial number of firms nonetheless have remained partnerships, thereby choosing to pay higher taxes. The point can be deflected by noting that Carr and Mathewson's limited liability explanation suffers from the same defect. The same firms that choose higher effective tax rates also choose unlimited, not limited, liability. More directly, while this is not the occasion to work out a complete account of the costs that might offset the tax benefits of incorporation, two sorts come to mind. First, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that professional partnerships maintain unlimited liability as a bond of the unobservable quality of their services. In some cases, the tax (and liability) benefits of incorporation may be outweighed by the cost of giving up the bond. Second, one effect of a pension plan is to impose a uniform savings rate on all partners. When a firm is composed of individuals of differing ages and wealth, unanimity may not exist among the partners concerning the appropriate savings rate, even when tax savings are taken into account. While side payments between partners might facilitate the optimal outcome, the transaction cost barriers to agreement may be substantial. state professional incorporation statutes the professional actually rendering services on behalf of the corporation remains personally liable. Thus all incorporations by sole proprietors must be tax motivated. It would be interesting to see whether the rate of incorporation differed between sole proprietorships and multilawyer firms. If limited liability is an important factor in the incorporation decision, the incorporation rate for multilawyer firms should be higher. (However, tax effects may cause this outcome to be overdetermined as well because increased size will increase the tax benefits of incorporation for multilawyer firms as well as the liability benefits.) The second approach builds on changes in the tax law. Beginning with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 and accelerating with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the tax benefits from operating a professional firm as a corporation have been dramatically reduced (Blackburn 1988) . Some light may be shed on the relative importance of tax and liability motives for professional incorporation by examining both the rates of incorporation since 1982 as compared with prior periods and the number of professional corporations that have chosen to disincorporate-return to an unlimited liability regime-since 1982.
